PROVISIONAL

For participants only

NPT/CONF.IV/SR.3
29 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3RD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

CONTENTS

Request from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine for observer status

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (continued)

General debate (continued)

Corrections to this record should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent within one week of the date of this document to the Official Records Editing Section, room E.4108, Palais des Nations, Geneva.

GE.90-66015/2318B

The meeting was called to order at 3.35 p.m.

REQUEST FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER MISSION OF PALESTINE FOR OBSERVER STATUS

The PRESIDENT said that a request had been received from the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to participate in the Conference as an observer and, in accordance with rule 44.2 (b) of the rules of procedure, he recommended that the request should be granted.

It was so decided.

ELECTION OF CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF THE MAIN COMMITTEES, THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE AND THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE (agenda item 5) (continued)

The PRESIDENT announced that the representative of Poland had been nominated to fill the remaining post of Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to the nomination.

It was so decided.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. GROS ESPIELL (Uruguay), after congratulating the President on his election, said that the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be placed in the general context of disarmament, its successes and failures, of efforts to restrict and regulate the use of other weapons of mass destruction or a particularly inhuman and destructive nature, of the right of every State to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of the new criteria arising from the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. His country therefore believed that the Conference should analyse implementation of the NPT in recent years in the light of progress and frustrations in disarmament over the same period, bearing in mind the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy of every State, whether or not it was a party to the Treaty.

The Conference, which was taking place under the terms of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, followed a period of five particularly rich years in which the acceleration of history had made for changes hardly envisaged in 1985. Progress in disarmament, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, the new concept of security in Europe, the reunification of Germany, the current significance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the cold war were all aspects to be taken into account in considering what the Treaty was to represent for the years ahead.

There were now 142 parties to the Treaty, a figure which conveyed the impression that it was one of the few international instruments approaching universality. However, it was not sufficient simply to count numbers; the

nuclear capacity of the countries which were not parties to the Treaty was also an important element for consideration. A matter of concern to his country was that, among those non-nuclear-weapon States which had made the greatest progress in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, several were not party to the Treaty. Of the nuclear-weapon States, as defined in article IX, paragraph 3, only three were parties to the Treaty. At the same time, the considerable importance of the non-nuclear-weapon States must be borne in mind as it became evident that the technical capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons lay within the reach of a growing number of countries. Such a situation must be faced with frankness and open-mindedness. The claim that the Treaty was discriminatory and violated the principle of the equality of States before the law was not entirely devoid of significance; Uruguay did not share that view, yet recognized that it was held by States which deserved attention and respect. Of the Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba were not parties to the Treaty - an anomalous but not irrational situation, the causes and effects of which called for analysis. It had become essential to achieve a formulation by which full peaceful use of nuclear energy could be permitted, without interference or condition. Only thus could the NPT or any similar instrument become fully universal. For that reason, individual and collective dialogue between the States Parties to the Treaty and other States was essential.

As to articles I and II of the Treaty and the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire such weapons, was everyone absolutely convinced that such was the case and that it could be asserted that no such State had made progress towards the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons? The present situation with respect to non-party States must also be considered. The Conference must examine matters as they really stood, with a genuine wish to find a solution. Articles IV and V should be examined in the context of new realities, so that the right recognized in article IV should not be discriminatory or subordinated to limitation requirements. The same could be said for article V.

Was the Treaty the only possible way to combat and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Actually, it was the most important, but not the sole or exclusive, means. Non-proliferation also had its basis in other treaties - those of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga - by which nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established. Such treaties did not have the discriminatory nature which some States found in the NPT, as they drew

no distinction between States Parties in relation to the prohibition on receiving, manufacturing, importing or using nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and IAEA safeguards agreements as well as unilateral and bilateral declarations represented different approaches to the common and universal objective of combating all forms of nuclear-weapon proliferation. Uruguay, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was making every effort to see that texts were adopted which would enable Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba also to become parties to that Treaty, so that the whole of Latin America might become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

As to Security Council resolution 255 (1968), of 19 June 1968, and the "negative" guarantee by nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, there could be no doubt about the legitimacy of such a requirement on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States, yet no legally binding convention had yet been elaborated. It was for that reason that the proposal by Nigeria (NPT/CONF.IV/17) was so important. His country supported the proposal in principle, although the text was unnecessarily complicated in structure, and hoped that in final form it might be approved and open for signature, ratification and accession by nuclear-weapon States. It should further be recalled that the "negative" guarantee was also contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union were parties, and in Protocols II and III of the Treaty of Rarotonga, signed and ratified by China and the Soviet Union.

The international non-proliferation régime was necessarily closely connected with the safeguards agreements provided for in the NPT, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga and of the Statutes of the IAEA. The latter organization had reported that on 31 December 1987 safeguards agreements were in force with nine non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to any of the three major treaties and which were engaged in significant nuclear activities, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba. It was important to note that fact as it showed that there was a will to accept international inspections even outside the context of the three treaties. It might thus be appropriate to examine, through a genuine process of self-criticism, the substantive reason why some States were not parties to any of the three treaties.

Lastly, Uruguay confirmed its readiness to co-operate realistically in an integral, just and non-discriminatory manner, in activities to combat the

proliferation of nuclear weapons. It wished to see such action truly integrated into a complete head-on struggle against all forms of armament, particularly weapons of mass destruction and chemical, bacteriological, radiological and space weapons - action which respected the peaceful use of nuclear energy and guaranteed the use of modern technologies and took into account the situations of those States which, in good faith and without warlike intent, had not yet signed the NPT. Only thus, within the broader framework of international law to combat nuclear proliferation could the Treaty continue in an age so different from that in which it had come into being in 1970.

Mr. VAERNO (Norway) said that the Treaty was the most important multilateral agreement on disarament and arms limitations concluded so far and its successful operation was of vital importance to the world community. The Conference had an important task before it in reviewing the operation of the Treaty over the past five years and in suggesting new measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The constructive atmosphere which had prevailed during the preparatory process leading up to the Conference augured well for a successful outcome stemming from a full and fair assessment of the operation of the Treaty leading to a balanced, substantive and forward-looking final document.

The current review exercise was taking place in a period of revolutionary change and upheaval; East-West relations had undergone a fundamental improvement and as a result of the peaceful revolution in Eastern Europe and the departure from previous policies, Europe was moving from an era of containment to an era of co-operation. Physical and political barriers had been dismantled, the painful post-War division of Europe was being overcome, as the imminent unification of Germany demonstrated, through the CSCE process and through existing institutions such as NATO, the European Communities and the Council of Europe; and the nations of Europe were endeavouring to develop co-operative structures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of misunderstanding.

In no other field had the new era in East-West relations made more impact than in arms control. Major progress - the INF Treaty and the Stockholm Document - had already been made and more significant achievements were within reach. The prospects of an early START Treaty, providing for sizeable reductions in strategic nuclear weapons were promising and it was to be hoped that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union

would be successfully concluded in the near future. In Vienna, the end-game in the negotiations on conventional forces was about to begin and his country was confident that, given the necessary political will, the major issues that remained outstanding could be sorted out in time for the first CFE treaty to be signed at the CSCE summit in November 1990. Together with a meaningful package on confidence- and security-building measures, such a CFE agreement could dramatically improve security and stability in Europe by eliminating the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations and would help consolidate the recent political changes and serve as a barrier against any attempt to re-establish the previous status quo. Such an agreement would also pave the way for significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals in Europe and new negotiations could be started on the reduction of Soviet and United States short-range nuclear forces. In addition, at the July summit in London, the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that they intended, in response to reciprocal action on the part of the Soviet Union, to eliminate all the Alliance's nuclear artillery shells in Europe.

However, events in the Gulf were casting a shadow over the positive developments in East-West relations and in the arms control field. The situation was aggravated by the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction and the crisis could be solved only by full adherence to the recent unanimous Security Council resolutions.

The issues before the Conference were global in nature. Concerted action by all countries was required to solve the problems facing them. In that context he reiterated his country's unequivocal support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its willingness to participate in all constructive efforts towards a strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. To illustrate its priorities, Norway, together with the other Nordic countries had submitted a memorandum (NPT/CONF.IV/18) listing a set of objectives and measures which they considered important. They had stated universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance with its obligations as the best way of achieving the Treaty's primary goals. It was therefore a most positive development that 141 countries were now parties to it.

The increasing number of adherents to the Treaty did not give grounds for complacency. As everyone was aware, some members of the world community, both nuclear and non-nuclear, had not yet become Parties. Some of them were on record as pursuing a policy in accordance with the basic principles of the

Treaty. Others, however, continued to state their reservations about the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime. That some of the non-Party States were present as observers at the Conference was an encouraging sign.

In considering compliance with articles I, II and III, the Conference would be reminded that the danger of proliferation was a very real one. The development of nuclear technology and the spread of technological knowledge and of nuclear installations to different parts of the world had meant that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had acquired the scientific and technological basis for developing nuclear-weapon programmes. It could thus be assumed that the number of States with a nuclear potential was greater than was openly acknowledged. Furthermore, a number of countries had, or could acquire, a reasonably effective nuclear delivery capability. The spread of such capabilities was of great concern to the world at large. Those issues should be adequately addressed at the present review.

Some non-Party States with substantial nuclear programmes seemed to feel that they were best served by keeping the nuclear option open. Such an approach was likely to create uncertainty and to exercise a negative influence on regional stability. A stabilizing and confidence-building effect would be achieved if the countries concerned at least concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA for all their nuclear facilities. But the situation also underlined the importance of continued efforts in support of universal adherence to the Treaty. His Government was convinced that no country's interest was served by pursuing a policy in favour of a nuclear-weapon capability.

The objectives of ending the nuclear arms race and implementing effective measures for nuclear disarmament were a major and integral part of the Treaty. It was gratifying to note that considerable progress had taken place during the period under review and that the prospects for further advances were good. In that connection, he referred in particular to the agreement on basic provisions of the START Treaty achieved at the United States-Soviet summit in June 1990. He also noted with satisfaction that the two parties were to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically to achieve a more stable strategic balance after the Treaty was completed. The signing of verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty opened the way for the ratification of those instruments and thus represented a step towards a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing.

A total and permanent ban on all nuclear explosions remained an important objective. His country was convinced that the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was an essential pre-condition for effectively halting the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that regard, it was a positive development that the Conference on Disarmament had in July 1990 finally reached agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In accordance with that mandate, the Committee had, as a first step, initiated substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban had to be seen in conjunction with efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it was worth noting that the members of NATO's integrated military structure had made it clear that, upon the total withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Europe and the implementation of a CFE agreement, they were prepared to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. In its London declaration the Alliance had made it clear that, in the new Europe, nuclear forces would only be weapons of last resort.

Norway was also very concerned about the environmental and health risks associated with underground nuclear testing, especially in vulnerable environments, and regarded those risks as an additional reason for discontinuing all test explosions. An effective verification system was of the utmost importance in any international arms control and disarmament agreement. In a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, international co-operation in the exchange and analysis of seismic data would be one of the main prerequisites for adequate monitoring of compliance. His country had consistently supported the efforts of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament to develop a global seismological system to assist in the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and considered that the outstanding problems of verification could be solved.

The Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty was to take place at the beginning of 1991. Norway would be participating in it and thought that one of the main objectives should be to give impetus to work being done on the test ban issue within the Conference on Disarmament.

The subject of negative security assurances had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for many years, and successive resolutions had also been adopted by the General Assembly. There was a patent need for an agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon

States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, little progress had been made on that issue in the past few years. Negative security assurances involved questions relating to the fundamental security of States. Given the wide range of security concerns and the variety of means available for dealing with them, it was difficult to arrive at a decision on a single common formula. Nigeria's proposal (NPT/CONF.IV/17) for an agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should, in his delegation's view, be discussed in the light of the development of the military doctrines of nuclear-weapon States.

An effective international non-proliferation régime was indispensable for expanded international co-operation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. IAEA safeguards played a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. However, the international safeguards régime needed to be further strengthened in order to develop measures to ensure a predictable long-term supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Norway was concerned that a number of countries, including some with substantial nuclear programmes, had not yet concluded the required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. That fact, together with disturbing reports of activities in some non-nuclear-weapon States, underlined the paramount importance of giving the IAEA the opportunity to verify the compliance of every non-nuclear-weapon State Party with its obligation not to divert peaceful nuclear material and equipment to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. That could be done only when all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties had concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as stipulated by the Treaty. His Government regarded as a positive development the fact that all nuclear-weapon States accepted limited voluntary IAEA safeguards on some of their civil nuclear facilities. Adequate safeguards were indeed one of the significant challenges facing the present non-proliferation régime. Effective strengthening of the régime implied that emerging nuclear suppliers and nuclear threshold countries had to be included in existing or new international export arrangements.

His Government continued to attach great importance to the obligations deriving from the Treaty and the non-proliferation régime as it existed at present, and considered that the application of full-scope safeguards by the recipient country should be a minimum condition for allowing export. Norway practised such control and was actively engaged in international co-operation

towards making it effective. Lastly, he hoped that the present review exercise would lay firm foundations for an indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

Mr. VITALONE (Italy) said that the Conference was opening at a time when the international community, faced with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, was threatened by events of unprecedented gravity and danger. The intolerable annexation of a free, sovereign State by another member of the United Nations, which as such was required to respect the sovereignty and independence of others, Iraq's brutal military aggression against Kuwait, were unacceptable to the international community, which had categorically condemned the invasion. International legality should now be restored by ensuring full observance of United Nations resolutions and putting an immediate end to a situation which represented a flagrant violation of human rights.

Against such a background, the overwhelming importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was self-evident. The Treaty's status as the principal multilateral instrument in the field of arms control was reflected by the fact that over 140 States had acceded to it in the desire not only to prevent a recurrence of the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also to contain the possibility of generalized conflict. Recent developments in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe had radically transformed the international scene, so that the Second World War and the ensuing cold war could be said to have come definitively to an end. In that connection he referred in particular to the London declaration of the NATO countries, as well as to the conclusion of the INF agreement and the agreements concerning the reduction by one-half of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two Great Powers. He also stressed the importance of the adoption of verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the ongoing Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and of the forthcoming Paris summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Italian Government, in its capacity as current President of the European Community, was actively engaged in all those endeavours.

While it represented an enormous improvement over the cold war era, the present situation was not, however, without its attendant dangers. In the first place, the process of East-West détente was accompanied by a potentially explosive growth of national ambitions. Such a development, especially in areas traditionally beset by regional conflicts, could be a threat to

international peace and regional stability. In that connection, he wished again to refer to the situation in the Gulf, on which Italy unconditionally shared the position of the other EEC countries. A second danger inherent in the international situation lay in the contrasting economic and demographic circumstances of different parts of the world. A third danger, dramatically evidenced by the problem of international drug trafficking, was related to the economic and social fields. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be seen against that background. His Government took the view that the efficacy of the Treaty should be safeguarded and improved in the interests of all - even in the presence of intolerable events such as those now taking place - through meticulous observance of its provisions and strict fulfilment of its objectives. Italy would make every effort to ensure that the Conference succeeded in laying the foundations for the decisive Conference of 1995 with a view to further consolidating the non-proliferation régime.

Participation in the IAEA safeguards system should represent an indispensable addition to adherence to the Treaty, particularly in the case of countries which, like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, had signed the Treaty and possessed nuclear installations of some importance. At the same time, everything should be done to optimize that system of international control, which had already produced highly positive results and constituted a most useful example for other arms control agreements.

A number of States had acceded to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference. It was to be hoped that others would follow, so that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons might become a truly universal objective. It was important that doubts in connection with nuclear programmes pursued by certain States should be dispelled and that agreements facilitating the effective performance of the IAEA's inspection functions should be generalized.

Gradual growth of co-operation and assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy undoubtedly formed an essential element of the system established under the non-proliferation régime. Since the previous Conference, prospects of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy had been profoundly shaken by the Chernobyl accident which had tragically brought out the crucial importance of nuclear safety arrangements. Italy was actively involved in international efforts in that field and was convinced that safety considerations should occupy a position of priority in all new technological research. In particular, it was determined to contribute towards the IAEA

programme of verification of the safety of nuclear facilities in Eastern Europe, to support all initiatives aimed at improving safety standards at nuclear power stations, and to encourage the dissemination of research on a new generation of fail-safe reactors.

Direct co-operation on ensuring maximum safety of nuclear facilities must begin by applying the types of technical assistance provided for in article IV. The IAEA agreements on the general procedures and mechanisms for meeting emergency situations must also be enhanced. Inspection missions undertaken at nuclear facilities by the Agency at the request of the States concerned must be stepped up. Consideration must be given to reconverting for peaceful uses the nuclear material used in the military sector. That meant not only reducing the overall quantity of fissionable material but also verifying whether such material had actually been reconverted, something which would thus prevent it from being diverted. One proposal, first put forward by Italy in 1967, would be to harness the fissionable material recovered from nuclear warheads scrapped by the super-Powers for peaceful uses in the least developed countries.

Italy had made a tangible contribution to the IAEA's technical assistance activities. A number of projects in agriculture and medicine had been of particular importance in improving the quality of life. Furthermore, Italy made regular financial contributions, amounting to $US 68 million in the past five years, to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics, in Trieste, run jointly by the IAEA and UNESCO. With regard to international security and disarmament, an area in which the Treaty had its main impact, progress could still be made on a comprehensive test ban, negative assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the creation of denuclearized zones. Multilateral negotiations must also be pursued to achieve a ban on chemical weapons.

The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was to maintain and strengthen an efficient international nuclear non-proliferation régime, which other countries must be encouraged to join. The past five years showed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had produced positive results.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan) said that the Conference should serve as an occasion to reaffirm the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in maintaining peace and security. With more than 140 States Parties, the NPT was the most widely accepted agreement in the history of international arms control. Japan was pleased that observers had been sent by two nuclear-weapon

States not parties to the NPT régime, France and China and it was also encouraged by the smooth implementation of the INF Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union and by the progress made in recent START negotiations towards reaching mutually acceptable solutions on major issues.

Nuclear energy currently generated 17 per cent of the world's electricity, a share that was on the increase, for its value as an energy source which did not produce carbon dioxide had attracted increased attention. Clearly, the NPT was functioning well as a basic framework for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation had doubts, however, about the NPT régime's success in preventing the development and possession of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. It was also a matter of major concern for many countries that some States Parties still failed to fulfil their obligations under the NPT to conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA for their nuclear facilities.

Japan had been undertaking various diplomatic steps to ensure the universality of the NPT. Appeals had been made to a number of non-Parties to join the Treaty. It was to be hoped that China and France would accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Until such time, Japan appealed to those two countries to continue to abide by the spirit of the NPT. It was gratifying that, at the Houston Economic Summit in July 1990, a joint statement on proliferation had been issued and all participants, including France, had supported a broad-ranging agreement on nuclear non-proliferation. Japan also called upon those non-nuclear-weapon States with major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to join the NPT régime as soon as possible. In the meantime, they must take concrete action to accept full-scope safeguards, thereby dispelling any suspicion regarding their motivations for not joining the NPT régime.

As to the export of nuclear-related equipment and materials to non-nuclear-weapon States, Japan had strict regulations for issuing export licences only when the recipient country adhered to the NPT and accepted full-scope safeguards under the IAEA. It was to be hoped that other exporting countries would implement equally strict regulations.

Although nuclear-weapon States were not required to accept IAEA safeguards under the NPT régime, they should be on an equal footing with non-nuclear-weapon States with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Japan therefore welcomed the conclusion in 1989 of the safeguards agreement

between China and the IAEA, following the example of other nuclear-weapon States. Clearly, IAEA safeguards should be applied to nuclear facilities in nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike.

Non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT must accept the full-scope safeguards applied to all nuclear activities on their territory. Since that comprehensive safeguards system lay at the core of the non-proliferation régime, the need for further technical and institutional improvement to ensure efficient implementation could not be over-emphasized. In view of the increase in both number and size of nuclear facilities throughout the world, and bearing in mind the financial constraints on the IAEA, efforts must be pursued to improve the cost-effectiveness of the safeguards procedures. The severe financial constraints placed upon a number of States Parties made it wise to begin streamlining the inspection activities by developing simplified safeguard methods. The established procedures for safeguards and inspections should be reviewed, with a view to enhancing the work of the system. The IAEA safeguards system had functioned smoothly for many years and could serve as a valuable example in developing a verification system for future multilateral disarmament agreements.

Japan was determined to continue to extend co-operation to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, yet at the same time work towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that context, it greatly valued the important role played by the IAEA. His country placed emphasis on multilateral co-operation through the IAEA, and had increased its contribution to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1990 to $5,120,000, or 11.27 per cent of the total, a figure that represented an increase of 193 per cent compared with that of five years earlier. Using its advanced technology in the nuclear field, Japan had been playing a central role in financial and technological assistance to developing countries in Asia and the Pacific through the implementation of regional co-operation programmes. Despite increasingly severe budgetary constraints, it would continue to contribute as much as possible towards expanding multilateral co-operation through the IAEA. Japan intended to enhance its bilateral co-operation with developing countries through technical and research co-operation activities. Such co-operation would be carried out only with those countries that had acceded to the NPT and had accepted the full-scope safeguards agreement.

At the Third Review Conference, his delegation had stressed the need for appropriate nuclear disarmament efforts by nuclear-weapon States, and Japan greatly appreciated the efforts made by those countries in the past five years. In particular, it hoped that the recent signing of the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty would pave the way for ratification of the two test-ban treaties at an early date. Japan was encouraged by the inclusion in the two protocols of provisions for verification through the hydrodynamic method, the seismological method and on-site inspections, and it hoped that the combined use of such techniques would help resolve the complex technical problems related to nuclear test-ban verification. His delegation urged the United States and the Soviet Union to draw upon the experience gained through the implementation of the two treaties to prepare the ground for the next stage of negotiations in the test-ban field as soon as possible.

Further nuclear disarmament could be achieved only if efforts were also made towards conventional arms control, for example, by removing the imbalance in conventional forces. His Government therefore welcomed the endeavours by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries to reach an agreement on the reduction on conventional forces in Europe.

The Conference on Disarmament was an eminently suitable forum for considering the issue of a nuclear test ban. The Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee, currently chaired by Japan, had a number of important items before it, such as the political and security implications of the continuance or discontinuance of nuclear tests, the modalities of a test ban to take into account such implications and technical problems relating to verification. In his opinion, the Conference on Disarmament had taken a significant step forward by initiating substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification and compliance. A step-by-step approach was the most realistic way to achieve a comprehensive test ban. His delegation hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee would be re-established at the beginning of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Obviously, some countries might still have reservations about strengthening the NPT régime, but a reluctance to accede to the Treaty and a reluctance to abide by its obligations by some States Parties because of the discriminatory nature of the NPT régime or because other countries failed to fulfil their obligations would delay the realization of the NPT's goal of

eliminating nuclear weapons and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT should be viewed as part of a dynamic process aimed at an ultimate objective rather than as a static collection of obligatory norms. Failure of the NPT régime would have serious consequences for international peace and security. Japan supported the NPT régime because of its unique role, its intrinsic discriminatory character notwithstanding. It was to be hoped that the international community also shared that view and would continue its efforts to strengthen the régime. Japan was convinced that the Conference would be a useful occasion for enhancing the requisite co-operation.

Mr. MacKAY (New Zealand) said it was particularly fitting that the Conference should be presided over by a citizen of a country which was a party both to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The task of the Conference involved a backward look over the five years since 1985 to see how the NPT had been fulfilled and also, implicitly, a look forward at what more could be done. It was also an occasion to look again at the bargain struck between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States in 1968 and see how the bargain was being kept.

The past five years had seen many positive developments: reduced tension in Europe, progress made in some areas of arms control and the fact that the NPT had gained greater support than ever before. The Treaty and its non-proliferation goal, had also been enhanced in other ways. At the time of the 1985 Review Conference, the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone had just been established by the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty was now in force and there were 11 States Parties. It established a nuclear-free zone which bordered on that created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that established by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Thus, a large part of the southern hemisphere had declared its determination to be free of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty of Rarotonga was intended to complement the NPT and specifically referred to article VII of the NPT in the preamble. It required the application of IAEA safeguards on all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities by the Parties. Like the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it also provided for a system of special - or challenge - inspections in the event of a suspected breach. The Treaty had protocols open to signature by the five nuclear-weapon States and China and the Soviet Union had signed them. The United States and the United Kingdom had affirmed that their actions were compatible with the protocols and his Government hoped that they would be able to transform those statements into a formal commitment by

signing the protocols. It was a matter of deep concern for New Zealand that one nuclear-weapon State, France, continued to test nucear weapons in the South Pacific. His delegation welcomed the presence of both France and China as observers at the Conference and hoped that, in the light of recent developments in arms control, France would decide to act in keeping with the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, in accordance with the wishes of the peoples of the South Pacific.

New Zealand, faithful to its undertakings under the Treaty of Rarotonga and the NPT, would never acquire nuclear weapons and such weapons had no part to play in its defence policies. In 1987, those principles were firmly embodied in legislation which established New Zealand as a nuclear-free zone. The law prohibited the introduction of nuclear weapons to New Zealand and the provisions of the NPT were explicitly incorporated into the country's legislation.

In the five years since the previous Review Conference, there had been unprecedented progress in nuclear disarmament as between the major Powers. The conclusion of the INF treaty had eliminated a whole category of weapons, agreement on significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons was close and there were grounds for optimism with regard to short-range nuclear forces. Welcome developments in the conventional area had also had an impact upon the nuclear arms race. The chemical weapons agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the progress towards an agreement on conventional forces in Europe showed a new willingness to achieve concrete and major disarmament measures.

The level of nuclear weapons, however, continued to be unacceptable and would remain so once all the agreements in prospect were completed. One arms control measure - specifically referred to in the preamble to the NPT - was a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, and little progress had been made in that regard. A comprehensive test ban was an essential and urgent step towards ending horizontal and vertical proliferation. That view had received overwhelming endorsement in the United Nations. As pointed out by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control: "Any nuclear test, by any nation, for whatever expressed purpose, is deeply offensive to New Zealand. Each new weapons system begets another. Each new test weakens the moral strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and increases the chances that another country will blast its way into the nuclear weapons club". The recent commencement of discussions on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on

Disarmament was to be welcomed but it did not involve the commencement of negotiations. Even with that limited mandate, one of the nuclear-weapon States - which was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty - would not participate. His delegation believed it essential for the Conference on Disarmament to remain seized of the issue of nuclear testing.

Securing universal adherence to, and ensuring full compliance with, the NPT constituted vital goals for all countries, since all of them benefited from the Treaty and not only the States Parties. The Treaty would, however, be immeasurably strengthened if every country became a party. In particular, membership by all nuclear-weapon States would lend even greater authority to the Treaty and to the norm of non-proliferation.

With or without universal adherence, however, non-proliferation could be effective only if States Parties complied scrupulously with their obligations. In particular, it was essential that mandatory safeguard agreements should be entered into in accordance with the clear requirements of the NPT. Instances of non-compliance were of the greatest concern to New Zealand, all the more so when the country concerned had significant nuclear activities. Only through the effective application of safeguards could the international community have confidence that the most fundamental of the obligations under the NPT was being met.

New Zealand fully supported efforts to strengthen the safeguards régime still further. It would like to see all nuclear-weapon States extend their voluntary offers to include all their peaceful nuclear facilities. It also strongly supported full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty.

It was important for all States Parties to have confidence that their security was enhanced by the NPT, something that was reflected in the search for a legally binding common formula on negative security assurances. His delegation shared the hope that the positive changes in the international scene would bring that possibility much closer.

Within the past five years the world had been given a stark - and appallingly tragic - reminder of the consequences of the atom unleashed. At the sametime it had been reminded of the value of the Treaty. In the next five years, efforts should be made to strengthen commitment to nuclear non-proliferation in all its forms. For New Zealand, that objective remained vital.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya) said that the NPT continued to be cherished by many States 20 years after its entry into force, as was eloquently reflected

by the fact that the Treaty now had more than 140 Parties and there were indications that the number would rise. The NPT continued to be a popular international document because the danger posed to international peace and security by the existence of nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of such weapons, had not diminished. That danger remained as long as nuclear weapons existed in the arsenals of some States and as long as a few other States gave hints that they sought to acquire or develop such destructive weapons. In the changing international political situation, the NPT had become more relevant than ever before. At a time when political and ideological divisions were dissolving, the potential for fulfilment of all the rights and obligations established by the Treaty had increased.

It was a fact that the Treaty had delineated two categories of States Parties: those States which possessed nuclear weapons and those which did not possess such weapons, with each category of States assuming different rights and obligations.

In his delegation's opinion, which was undoubtedly shared by many others, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to maintain international peace and stability, it had prevented the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States had observed the undertaking not to facilitate the emergence of other nuclear-weapon States. It was important to note that no other nuclear-weapon State had clearly come into existence since the NPT had entered into force. The nuclear-weapon States outside the NPT had, in declarations made in various international forums, committed themselves to the purposes and objectives of the NPT, and their actions, which were not legally constrained, had bolstered efforts to promote the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT had provided an opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce legally their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons. Such renunciation by a majority of non-nuclear-weapon States was a direct contribution to the security and stability of the world and a strong rejection of weapons of mass destruction.

Again, the NPT was a valid treaty because, in seeking to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it did not prohibit the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or international co-operation in such uses.

The Treaty sought to prohibit not only horizontal proliferation but also vertical proliferation. Article VI of the Treaty still remained to be totally fulfilled. Two of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued to be engaged in bilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament negotiations that

had already culminated in the destruction of a whole category of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, those weapons continued to exist in the arsenals of a few States. The negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons should encompass all those States which possessed such weapons. The world could not be safe until all nuclear weapons, wherever they existed, were effectively and verifiably destroyed. The banning of all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time was long overdue. Under the present favourable international circumstances, there was no justification for the continuation of those tests.

The NPT had not limited the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones in their regions. The establishment of such zones had strengthened efforts against proliferation. It would be an important step if all nuclear weapon States were legally to recognize those zones in international treaties and lend their support to all efforts aimed at creating them in various parts of the world. In Africa, the legal recognition of such a zone would be most welcome.

Since non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT had given up their sovereign right to acquire nuclear weapons, it was essential to give them credible guarantees, in a legally binding international instrument, that they would not be attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, the most effective guarantee for the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States would be total elimination and destruction of all nuclear weapons.

At the Second and Third Review Conferences criticisms had been levelled against the NPT and would no doubt be levelled again on the present occasion and prior to the 1995 Conference to decide whether the Treaty was to continue in force indefinitely or to be extended for an additional fixed period. The inequalities inherent in the NPT with regard to the rights and obligations of the States Parties had largely contributed to some States choosing to remain outside the Treaty. Any process that could lead to such States joining the NPT would be commendable. In the perspective of 1995, his Government was in favour of extending the NPT until its main objective, namely the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons both vertically and horizontally, was completely fulfilled.

Political problems required political solutions and not military solutions. The faulty logic of regarding nuclear weapons as instruments to achieve political aims would only encourage other States to acquire nuclear

weapons. Nuclear weapons did not offer security; they offered total destruction. Total elimination of those weapons would discourage others from desiring to acquire them.

The PRESIDENT said that, pursuant to rule 19 of the rules of procedure, he would give the floor to the representative of Iraq to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. AL-KOTAL (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the representative of Italy had referred in his statement to the legality of recent events in the Middle East and to what that representative had called certain "humanitarian" aspects. Actually, it was perfectly clear that those events fell within the competence of other international bodies and any mention of them was out of place at the present Review Conference on the operation of the NPT.

There was one point, however, arising out of the Italian representative's remarks which was indeed relevant to the present proceedings and it was one to which that representative had deliberately omitted any reference. It was the negative repercussion on the purposes of the NPT of the presence in the Gulf of warships with nuclear weapons on board. That situation seriously affected the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States of the region. An illegal blockade had been imposed on Iraq with the aim of starving its 18 million inhabitants, thereby turning the Iraqi people into hostages.

The selective approach of the Italian delegation was clear. He wished to know what Italy had done when Israel had invaded Lebanon, part of whose territory Israel still occupied. He also wished to know what Italy had done over the period of more than 20 years in which Israel had been in occupation of Arab territories in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon. Facts such as the annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights by Israel were being ignored. Resort was being had to military measures in which Italy was participating; measures that would make it impossible for a peaceful solution to be reached to the Arab problem. Such a solution was the sole responsibility of the Arabs themselves and could not be the subject of bargaining or of foreign interference. Lastly, it was his hope that the Italian statement would not have any adverse repercussions on the Conference and on the NPT itself.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.